Analysis
Why the Combine failed in its aim to achieve success in getting its Alternative Plan implemented
In January 1976
the Secretary of the Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards Committee submitted
their Alternative Plan for the Company to Lucas Aerospace management. In the
following paragraphs an analysis will be made of the events which unfolded
based on available documented evidence.
The evidence
originates from the following three sources:
1. Correspondence
from and to Lucas Management
2.
Hansard
3.
Diary
of Betrayal ( C.A.I.T.S. document )
The
evidence relates to the roles of Lucas Aerospace management, Trade Union Full
Time Officers and the Governments Department of Industry.
The
role of Management is shown in the correspondence which was made available to
ex Combine members by a former Personnel Department staff. Whilst a thorough
examination of the correspondence will be made at a later date, for the benefit
of this analysis some correspondence will be referred to.
As
can be expected Management were put on the back foot by the Combine taking the
initiative. They were used to the Trade Unions reacting to their decisions!
They were confronted with a fifty eight page document outlining the Plan and
informed that detailed product information was available to back up the Plan.
The Management response was as follows.
1.
They
refused to meet with the Combine to discuss the Plan, has they did not
recognise them as an official trade union body.
2.
Management
handed out the reply to Trade Union reps at site level saying that they
rejected the alternative product approach indicating that aerospace work was
the best way to retain jobs. Their dismissive reply was handed back to
management by the trade union reps.
3.
The
management were willing to talk at site level with recognised trade union reps
on products and that was taking place.( this was not true - no discussion on
products ever took place )
4.
The
correspondence made clear that management policy was to set up Consultative
Committees at site level. A policy that was at odds to the Combines approach of
negotiating at national level. It has to be remembered that this was during the
period when discussions were taking place between Government, the T.U.C. and
the C.B.I. about worker participation in Industry.
5.
They
carried out a public relation exercise to indicate their social responsibility.
6.
Those
Combine members actively involved in Plan activities at home and abroad were
identified and site industrial relations officers were informed to check on
whether they took unpaid leave.
7.
The
only positive response was from the head of the New Products Division who
suggested that a Consultant should be seconded to the Combine to assist on
productive development. This suggestion was not supported-in fact the
management made it clear that their stated aim was to “destroy the Combine”
The
General Secretaries of the appropriate Trade Unions were written to informing
them of the Companies policy on the Combine. The following is their response:
1.
The T.G.W.U. and the G.M.W.U. acknowledged the letter without further comment.
2.
A.P.E.X. made it clear that it did not recognise the Combine and objected “in
the strongest manner possible” to any developments which resulted in the
company “conferring consultative or negotiating rights upon an unofficial body”
3.
The A.U.E.W. stated that they were aware of the Combine Committees existence
and “did not oppose the principle of having discussions of a global nature with
respective Combines”
The
above mixed response from the Trade Unions had no effect on Management policy,
which still maintained that as the Combine was an unofficial body they would
not meet or discuss with them matters of overall Company policy.
Unfortunately,
there was no Trade Union recognition of Combine Committees. The vehicle for
such recognition was the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions
who recognised multi-union committees at individual site level but not at
multi-site (national) level. Despite the efforts made by the Combine Secretary
to get recognition from the C.S.E.U., he was unsuccessful. This was an obvious
weakness in the Trade Union organisation in relation to shop stewards being
able to negotiate on corporate issues in Companies which operate on a
multi-site basis.
Throughout
the campaign, Lucas Aerospace management very much took advantage of the
“unofficial body” title that the Combine was given. Unfortunately at least one
union also used that as a reason to not support the Combine and its Plan.
While
the “official” structures may not have existed, the A.U.E.W. took a more
pragmatic approach as did the T.G.W.U.(who were very supportive of the Combine
and the Plan) realising that Combine Shop Stewards Committees were necessary if
the multi-site based companies were to be held accountable to their workforces
on Corporate matters.
This
approach was not adopted by A.P.E.X. They were very much opposed to the Combine
seeing it as a threat to their long standing agreements between the Company and
their union. In a letter to the General Secretary of the T.U.C., they indicated
that “the Combine Committee had no formal relationship with any of the manual
or staff unions with membership within Lucas Aerospace” Given that they
considered the Combine as an unofficial body they had made it clear to Lucas management
“that should the company enter into any discussions with the combine(d)
committee my union would regard such a development as being a breach of the
agreements which my union has with Lucas Industries and Lucas Aerospace” After
requesting the T.U.C. General Secretary “to take appropriate action on this
matter” A.P.E.X. copied the letter to Lucas Management.
To
put it briefly (see Combine History for more detail) the Combine Committee had
been established to fill the gap that existed at Lucas Aerospace corporate
level where there was no multi-union representation by shop stewards and staff
reps together. The Combine was a recommending body dealing in corporate issues
with individual unions at site level making the final decision. It never ever
cut across or replaced individual agreements that manual or staff unions had
with Lucas Aerospace management. All those involved in the Combines decision
making process were recognised Senior Trade Union representatives at individual
site level.
While
previously T.A.S.S. had formally indicated their support for the Combine’s Plan
their actions were at variance with that decision. For example, in an internal
memo, the managements Members of the Policy Executive were informed about an
off the record comment made by a Senior T.A.S.S. Official to the companies
Personnel Director. He along with the General Secretary had met with Government
Ministers who wanted to know “what was the official position of T.A.S.S. in
regard to the Combine especially Messrs Cooley and Scarbrow” The T.A.S.S
Official “ tells me that they outlined to the Minister that they were opposed
to many aspects of the Combine and understood the Companies position”
On
another occasion the Personnel Director informed the T.A.S.S. Official by
letter that Mike Cooley had given lectures at Henley College in which he
referred to the Corporate Plan. He stated that he thought he should know that
given that in the past “your union had reservations about Mr Cooley making
statements through the media and on public platforms often inferring that he is
expressing a T.A.S.S. point of view”
There appears to have been an unhealthy close
relationship between T.A.S.S. Trade Union Officials and the Company. Also the
Dept of Industry Ministers were very much influenced by the same T.A.S.S.
Officials. The management were also guilty of misleading Ministers on how they
were responding to the Combines initiative.
At the same
time the Combine were never given the opportunity to meet with D.O.I. Ministers as a
follow up on the initial meeting with the Secretary of State for Industry Tony
Benn who had suggested that the Combine produce a Plan.
As it was
Labour Party policy to support the Combine and the Alternative Plan, a number
of Labour M.Ps pressured Ministers to act on the Combines behalf ( see
Hansard 12/1/77, 28/11/77, 15/5/78, 17/5/78 and the12/2/79.) Despite this
pressure being applied in Parliament and a letter being sent from Jeff Rooker
the M.P. for Perry Barr Birmingham to the Chairman of Lucas Industries, no
progress was made.
The above
Analysis is based on the period covered by available Lucas management
correspondence. For a more comprehensive record of the Combines unsuccessful
Corporate Plan campaign see the C.A.I.T.S pamphlet “ Diary of Betrayal “ link.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The analysis
has shown how Corporate power prevented the Lucas Aerospace workers from
getting their Alternative Plan implemented within the company. No matter how
good the arguments put forward, no matter the level of support the Plan
attracted, Lucas Aerospace management, despite being put on the back foot,
refused to budge.
Yet there could have been a different outcome
if the Government had used its financial muscle to better effect. It had been
more than generous in the past by deferring £56m. of Lucas Industries tax. To
add insult to injury they provided further financial support with a grant of
£8m. to Lucas Aerospace, when the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering
Officials became involved in 1979. This was not good value for taxpayers money
when you consider 500 jobs were lost in the process! This was a particularly
good example of the taxpayer bailing out a Company when it allegedly had a
problem. i.e. Corporate Welfare, for more click here
The role of
some of the Trade Union Officials has to be questioned. While you would expect
management to use “Combines are unofficial bodies” as a means of refusing to
negotiate, you would not have expected the Officials to have been so
enthusiastic to stand in line with management on this issue. Especially when
those involved in the Combine were Senior Shop Stewards and fully paid up
members of those Unions who were failing to support them! It makes you wonder whether managements
approach to negotiating with the Combine would have been different if all the
Union Officials had taken a more pragmatic approach to the issue of the Combine
being an unofficial body. Because the Combine’s record in saving jobs, when
faced with redundancy, had been outstanding with not one job being lost through
enforced redundancy in ten years. With that record the Full Time Officials
would have best served their members better by continuing to take a back seat
and let the Combine get on with it!
When it comes
down to it the Combine where up against it from the start due to not being on a
level playing field with management in terms of a power relationship. Unless
workers and their trade union representatives operate within a democratic
structure they will find it difficult if not impossible to bring about changes
to Corporate Policy. Whereas Shop Stewards can motivate their members to take
action to fight for a wage claim or resist redundancy it’s a different kettle
of fish when it comes to investment policy or product range. When and only when
workers representatives have the same power as shareholders will workers be in
a position to influence Corporate decision making (see Industrial Democracy
link here).
While the
above Analysis applies to the Combines campaign 40 years ago it would seem that
the barriers that existed in the 1970s are still there. In these circumstances
it would seem that Government Legislation is required in the areas of
Industrial Democracy and Planning Agreements.
Brian Salisbury, October 2020
